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Analogical Reasoning in Public Health 
 
Abstract: 
Analogical reasoning is a valuable logical resource in a public health context. It is used 
extensively by public health scientists in risk assessments of new technologies, 
environmental hazards and infectious diseases. For its part, the public also avails of 
analogical reasoning when it assesses a range of public health problems. In this article, some 
of these uses of analogical reasoning in public health are examined. Analogical arguments 
have courted approval and disapproval in roughly equal measure by a long succession of 
logicians and philosophers. The logical features of these arguments which make them 
simultaneously compelling and contemptible are considered. As a form of presumptive 
reasoning, analogical arguments have a valuable role to play in closing epistemic gaps in 
knowledge. This heuristic function of these arguments is illustrated through an examination 
of some uses of analogical reasoning in recent public health crises. Finally, the results of a 
study of analogical reasoning in 879 members of the public are reported. This study reveals 
that lay members of the public are able to discern the logical and epistemic conditions 







Analogies are a universal feature of human thinking and language. Woods (2004: 273) 
remarks that ‘we do it all the time. Analogical characterizations come trippingly from the 
tongue’. The similarities between people, objects and events that form the very essence of 
analogies have attracted the interest of scholars in academic disciplines ranging from 
literature and linguistics to computer science and psychology (Guarini et al., 2009). One 
scientific discipline where analogies have been used extensively, but which has yet to 
receive much scrutiny, is public health. This paper will address this omission in the literature 
by examining the use of analogical arguments in a public health context. It must be 
emphasized from the outset, however, that this is more than an academic or philosophical 
exercise. Specifically, it will be contended that analogical arguments are a vital logical tool in 
the rational resources that one brings to the judgement of public health problems. But we 
must set down at a number of staging posts before we can arrive at this claim. In this 
section, we begin by examining some uses of analogical arguments in public health. This 
examination confirms the view that public health is a significant domain for the exercise of 
analogical reasoning. In section 2, the logical structure of this type of reasoning is 
addressed. The views – both positive and negative – of some of the many logicians and 
philosophers who have commented upon analogical arguments are considered at this point. 
This discussion prepares the ground for an analysis in section 3 of the rational role of 
analogical argument in public health judgements. In steering these judgements when 
knowledge is absent or lacking, analogical argument can be seen to assume a heuristic 
function in our rational deliberations. Finally, in section 4, the findings of a study of 
analogical reasoning in 879 members of the public are reported. These findings confirm a 
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role for this type of reasoning as a facilitative cognitive heuristic in a context of epistemic 
uncertainty. 
 
To avoid logical complexity at this early stage of the discussion, I begin with a dictionary 
definition of analogical reasoning. The third edition of the Collins English Dictionary defines 
analogical reasoning as ‘a form of reasoning in which a similarity between two or more 
things is inferred from a known similarity between them in other respects’ (1991: 53). This 
definition captures the essential attributes of any analogy: a similarity is inferred from a 
known similarity between at least two things. These attributes are consistent features of the 
many, different examples of analogical reasoning which have found their way into public 
health.1 In this context, analogical arguments have been used in relation to infectious 
diseases such as human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS), as well as zoonoses2 such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). 
Early public health advice issued by the Centers of Disease Control (CDC) in the United 
States was based upon an analogy between the epidemiology of AIDS and the epidemiology 
of another infectious disease, that of hepatitis B (see Cummings (2004) for discussion). 
Specifically, similarities in the epidemiology of these diseases led investigators to conclude 
that the pathogen responsible for AIDS must be transmitted sexually and parenterally in 
exactly the same way that hepatitis B is transmitted sexually and parenterally.3 The 
analogical argument in this case took the following form: 
 
MAJOR PREMISE: AIDS and hepatitis B have similar epidemiological features. 
MINOR PREMISE: Hepatitis B is transmitted sexually and parenterally. 




The major premise of this analogical argument – and, indeed, the major premise of any 
analogical argument – incorporates substantial background knowledge. In this case, it was 
knowledge of the epidemiology of AIDS and hepatitis B, namely, that these diseases were at 
the time most prevalent among homosexual males, intravenous drug users and recipients of 
blood transfusions and blood-derived products (e.g. factor VIII for the treatment of 
haemophilia). The minor premise of this argument reflected what was by the early 1980s 
well-established knowledge of the routes of transmission of hepatitis B. The conclusion of 
this analogical argument was the basis of public health advice from the CDC to use sexual 
protection (i.e. condoms) and to avoid sharing needles during intravenous drug use: ‘With 
hepatitis B as a guide it was possible to devise, very early in the epidemic, effective 
guidelines for prevention of HIV infection. The recommendation to avoid sharing ‘bodily 
fluids’ came directly out of hepatitis B research’ (Muraskin, 1993: 109). Plant (2008: 49) 
describes how analogical reasoning shaped early actions in the management of SARS: ‘we 
considered that the SARS organism was most likely a virus and spread predominantly via the 
respiratory route. Hence we acted as though that was true, meaning that infection control, 
patient management, patient isolation and so on were all treated as though the (assumed) 
virus causing SARS was similar to other viruses’. The reconstructed analogical argument to 
which Plant refers appears as follows: 
 
MAJOR PREMISE: SARS is similar to other viruses. 
MINOR PREMISE: Other viruses are spread predominantly via the respiratory route. 




It is the conclusion of this argument which provided support for the infection control 
measures (patient isolation, etc.) which Plant describes above. An analogy between SARS 
and the influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 (Spanish flu) was repeatedly employed by the 
World Health Organization and other agencies during the SARS outbreak of 2003 (see 
Zylberman (2010) for discussion of this analogy and other historical analogies involving 
influenza epidemics). A particularly well entrenched analogical argument during the BSE 
epidemic in the UK drew on an analogy between BSE and another transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy (TSE) in sheep known as scrapie. This argument came to influence most risk 
assessments relating to BSE with ultimately disastrous consequences for human health.4 The 
argument had the following form: 
 
MAJOR PREMISE: BSE in cattle is similar to scrapie in sheep. 
MINOR PREMISE: Scrapie is not transmissible to humans. 
CONCLUSION:       BSE will not be transmissible to humans.  
 
Analogical reasoning is often at the heart of the public’s concerns about public health issues. 
Not all of this reasoning is rationally warranted even though it may appear persuasive in the 
contexts in which it is advanced. For example, individuals and pressure groups have used 
arguments such as the following to oppose the erection of mobile phone transmission 
masts, particularly in the vicinity of schools and childcare centres. This is despite the fact 
that there are significant dissimilarities in the emissions from transmission masts and 
electricity pylons (i.e. the major premise is problematic). Also, evidence in support of a link 
between non-ionising radiation from electricity pylons and childhood cancer is tentative to 




MAJOR PREMISE: Mobile phone transmission masts and electricity pylons emit non-ionising  
                                radiation. 
MINOR PREMISE: Non-ionising radiation from electricity pylons has been linked to  
                                childhood cancer. 
CONCLUSION:       Non-ionising radiation from mobile phone transmission masts will be  
                                linked to childhood cancer. 
 
Another recent public health issue in which analogical reasoning can be seen to play a role 
concerns the teratogenic effects of taking sodium valproate (Epilim) during pregnancy. From 
newspaper reports to blogs and the narrated experiences of parents, public discourses on 
this issue have increasingly involved an analogy with Thalidomide, a drug widely used in the 
1960s to control morning sickness during pregnancy. In at least some of these discourses, 
this analogy has been used to support the view that Epilim is responsible for a range of birth 
and developmental anomalies in babies and children who were pre-natally exposed to this 
drug.6 This is despite the fact that significant dissimilarities surround the use of these drugs 
during pregnancy (e.g. Epilim is used to manage a serious, neurological disorder (i.e. 
epilepsy) while Thalidomide was used to treat an unpleasant, but not life-threatening, 
symptom of pregnancy). The analogical argument in this case unfolds as follows:    
 
MAJOR PREMISE: Epilim and Thalidomide are prescribed medicines sometimes taken during  
                                pregnancy. 
MINOR PREMISE: Thalidomide has teratogenic effects on a developing foetus. 




A conclusive, causal link may eventually be demonstrated between the ingestion of Epilim 
during pregnancy and the development of conditions such as autism spectrum disorders in 
children. But prior to that demonstration, the above analogical argument is making the 
logical case for such a link on the ground that babies were exposed to these drugs during 
critical periods in their pre-natal development. The similarity which links Epilim and 
Thalidomide is nothing more than the fact that both drugs have been ingested by women 
during pregnancy (major premise). We have seen that Epilim and Thalidomide are used to 
treat different conditions. Moreover, these drugs do not contain the same active 
ingredients, so at best a rather loose similarity obtains between them. However, this is often 
the case in the analogies which are used by lay members of the public when considering 
public health problems. Hunt and Frewer (2001) found that subjects in the UK identified BSE 
as an analogue for GM food. GM food was overwhelmingly identified by these subjects as a 
health risk in the same way that BSE posed a health risk to humans. However, apart from 
the fact that BSE and GM food present an actual and potential risk, respectively, to the 
safety of the food we eat, these issues are dissimilar in other, significant respects (e.g. BSE is 
a zoonosis while GM food is the product of scientific and technological innovations). In any 
event, the analogical argument in this case has the following form: 
 
MAJOR PREMISE: BSE and GM food are (actual and potential) threats to the safety of food. 
MINOR PREMISE: BSE poses health risks to humans. 




This section has presented several examples of analogical reasoning in the context of public 
health. Some of these examples have been used by public health agencies and experts to 
frame health advice to the public or to guide risk assessments. Other examples are currently 
used by members of the public to raise concerns about the potential health risks of an 
activity or agent. The content of these arguments is wide-ranging and spans infectious 
diseases, environmental hazards, and risks associated with new technologies and prescribed 
medications. Some of these analogical arguments are more rationally warranted than 
others. But each has been used to fulfil a specific argumentative purpose for the various 
experts and lay people who have advanced them. In the next section, we examine the 
logical and other features of these arguments which make them more or less rationally 
warranted in certain contexts of use. This examination will include historical and present-
day views of the rational merits and logical weaknesses of analogical arguments. As well as 
reflecting the diverse philosophical views which exist of analogical argument, this 
examination will lay the ground for the discussion in section 3 of how this argument can 
function as a facilitative heuristic during public health reasoning.  
 
2. Analogical argument 
Thus far, analogical argument or reasoning has been defined in the following terms: a form 
of reasoning in which a similarity between two or more things is inferred from a known 
similarity between them in other respects. This definition lacks detail in a number of 
important respects. For example, what type of inference takes us from the known similarity 
to the new similarity? Can the known similarity between two things involve just a couple of 
properties, or should two things be similar in every conceivable respect to qualify as an 
analogy? In this section, we begin to add logical flesh to the bones of this definition. The 
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standard, logical approach to analogical argument requires first that we establish if the 
arguments presented in section 1 are types of deductive or inductive argument. (We have 
already indicated in note 1 that they are not figurative analogies, although figurative 
analogies are also commonplace in public health.) Some logicians go further than presenting 
an inductive characterization of these arguments and introduce the idea that analogical 
argument is a type of presumptive reasoning. We will consider what a presumptive 
approach to analogical argument involves. The issue of how analogical argument should be 
evaluated – as good or valid reasoning versus poor or invalid reasoning – depends on the 
type of argument it may be taken to be. Historically, analogical arguments have been 
viewed as a type of weak or sub-standard inductive argument. It is contended that this is on 
account of the application of inductive criteria to what is a presumptive argument,7 and that 
when assessed according to appropriate criteria, analogical arguments have rational merits 
which have often been overlooked or poorly characterized. These merits are fully explored 
within a discussion of the heuristic function of analogical arguments in section 3. 
 
In section 1, it was described how the analogical arguments illustrated therein had been 
used ‘to fulfil a specific argumentative purpose’ for the experts and lay people who had 
advanced them. Waller (2001: 213) places a similar emphasis on the function of an analogy, 
on what an analogy ‘is designed to accomplish’, in his three-part classification of analogies: 
 
‘The key to distinguishing analogies lies in examining what the analogy is 
designed to accomplish. A figurative analogy uses more familiar images to help 
us understand something that is complex, confusing, or unfamiliar; but it does 
not offer reasons for a conclusion. A deductive argument by analogy reminds us 
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of a principle which (it is assumed) we all share, and demands that we draw a 
consistent conclusion. An inductive argument by analogy makes a probable 
projection based on relevant similarities. The categorization of these analogies 
turns on what function they are designed to serve’. 
 
Emissions from mobile phone transmission masts are certainly ‘complex, confusing or 
unfamiliar’ to most lay people. However, there is no sense in which emissions from 
electricity pylons are any more familiar, or that they serve as an ‘image’ which helps us 
understand emissions from masts. So whatever type of analogy is at work in this case, it is 
not a figurative analogy. Nor is it a deductive argument by analogy. What type of ‘principle’ 
shared by all of us is implicit in this argument? There is no principle which ordains that 
emissions from electricity pylons or transmission masts cause cancer. The latter are 
empirical facts which are established through a process of scientific investigation. One could 
quite easily envisage how the same emissions might have no health effects whatsoever or 
could cause human diseases other than cancer. The analogies in section 1 come closest to 
inductive analogical arguments. In each of these analogies, we are using similarities 
between two cases to infer a further similarity between these cases. It is a ‘probable 
projection’ that if electricity pylons emit non-ionising radiation which causes childhood 
cancer that the non-ionising radiation emitted by mobile phone transmission masts will also 
cause childhood cancer. But because we are dealing with a probable projection, we will not 
be surprised if the scientific community should conclude at some point that there is no 
causal link between the non-ionising radiation emitted by transmission masts and the 
development of childhood cancer. In other words, inductive analogical arguments – or at 
least the conclusions thereof – can be (and not infrequently are) erroneous (see note 4 for 
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an example of an erroneous inductive analogical argument which had particularly serious 
consequences for human health). A schematic model of an inductive analogical argument is 
presented below (Waller, 2001: 202). D and E in this model may be taken to represent two 
entities, people or events: 
 
1. D has characteristics e, f, g, and h. 
2. E also has characteristics e, f, g, and h. 
3. D also has characteristic k. 
4. Having characteristics e, f, g, and h is relevant to having characteristic k. 
5. Therefore, E will probably also have characteristic k. 
 
Premises (1) and (2) in Waller’s formulation are represented by the major premise in the 
analogical arguments displayed in section 1. Waller’s premise (3) is the minor premise in 
these arguments. Premise (4) in Waller’s scheme is implicit in the analogical arguments in 
section 1. This premise states that a set of characteristics is relevant to a further 
characteristic about which we want to draw a conclusion. For example, the characteristic 
‘emits non-ionising radiation’ is relevant to the characteristic ‘causes childhood cancer’ in 
that non-ionising radiation can trigger the genetic mutations which lead to the development 
of cancer.  
 
The issue of the relevance of similarities to a further characteristic about which we want to 
draw a conclusion is particularly important as it is the basis upon which so many analogical 
arguments are shown to be wanting. For example, early laboratory and epidemiological 
investigations suggested that BSE and scrapie were similar in several respects. These 
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diseases appeared to have molecular properties, histopathological characteristics and 
epidemiological features in common. However, these similarities, substantial though they 
were, were ultimately shown to be less relevant to the issue of the transmissibility of BSE 
than a single dissimilarity relating to the genetics of these diseases which only strain-typing 
studies could reveal (see Cummings (2010) for further discussion). In this case, several 
similarities between BSE and scrapie which collectively had low relevance to the issue of the 
transmissibility of BSE were less significant to the success or otherwise of this analogical 
argument than a single (genetic) dissimilarity between these diseases which had high 
relevance to the transmissibility of BSE. 
 
The use of ‘probably’ in the conclusion in (5) is in recognition of the fact that the inference 
in an inductive analogical argument is probabilistic in nature. This means we must always be 
prepared to countenance error in the case of an inductive analogical argument. Even the 
most strongly warranted argument may ultimately be shown to be erroneous if the 
evidential base upon which it is based changes at a later point in time. The probabilistic 
nature of the inference in an inductive analogical argument keeps us mindful of this fact. 
 
Historically, it is as a form of inductive argument that analogical argument has come under 
most scrutiny from logicians. One logician in particular, John Stuart Mill, found little logical 
merit in this form of argument. This is how Mill characterized analogical argument in 
Chapter V of A System of Logic: 
 
‘The last of the modes of erroneous generalization to which I shall advert, is that 
to which we may give the name of False Analogies. The Fallacy stands 
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distinguished from those already treated of by the peculiarity, that it does not 
even simulate a complete and conclusive induction, but consists in the 
misapplication of an argument which is at best only admissible as an 
inconclusive presumption, where real proof is unattainable’. 
 
According to Mill, the logical weakness of this argument lies in its falling short of a ‘complete 
and conclusive induction’. Analogical argument is little better than an ‘incomplete 
presumption’ which occurs in the absence of ‘real proof’. It is a sign of how much our view 
of this argument has changed since Mill wrote these comments that presumption is no 
longer levelled as a criticism of analogical argument. In fact, many present-day logicians are 
actively developing presumptive analyses of this argument. Indeed, it is a presumptive 
analysis which is most apt for the view of analogical argument as a cognitive heuristic which 
is developed in this paper. In expounding that view, we need to examine the features of 
presumption which make this concept particularly suited to performing this heuristic 
function. Those features divide roughly into dialectical and epistemic properties. The 
combination of both types of properties is required in order to understand how analogical 
argument functions as a heuristic in a public health context. A dialectical conception of 
presumption captures the scheme of critical questions which arguers pose to themselves as 
they attempt to assess the rational merits of analogical argument and any claim supported 
by means of that argument. These questions form part of the critical, rational resources that 
lay people draw upon when they are required to arrive at judgements about public health 
problems. An epistemic conception of presumption captures features of this concept which 
make it particularly well suited to the uncertainty of the contexts in which public health 
deliberations proceed. In these contexts, we often lack the knowledge that is required to 
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assess the risks posed by certain agents and activities. Yet, we must still make assessments 
of those risks. Epistemic presumption is the rational resource which permits us to arrive at 
these judgements in the absence of knowledge. We consider both approaches to 
presumption in this section.   
 
The concept of presumption is typically found within a critical discussion in which two 
parties are contesting a certain thesis or statement. At any point in this discussion, only one 
of these parties can lay claim to the presumption, while the other party has a responsibility 
to discharge a burden of proof: ‘When one is engaged in making the case for a conclusion it 
is very important in practice to be clear on which side the Presumption lies, and to which 
belongs the Burden of Proof’ (Hamblin, 1970: 170; italics in original). When an arguer 
succeeds in discharging a burden of proof onto his opponent, the presumption returns to his 
side of the discussion. It is within the dialectical context of a critical discussion that Walton 
(1996: 80) wishes to frame the argument from analogy: ‘argument from analogy is 
characteristically used to shift a burden of proof in a critical discussion of an issue that has 
two sides’. An opponent in argument can quickly discharge his or her burden of proof if it 
can be demonstrated that the argument from analogy does not hold up in some respect. To 
this end, he or she can draw upon a number of critical questions to reveal any weaknesses 
in this argument, should they exist. Walton (1996: 79) characterizes these questions as 
follows: 
 
1. Are C1 and C2 similar, in the respect cited? 
2. Is A true (false) in C1? 
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3. Are there differences between C1 and C2 that would tend to undermine the force of the 
similarity cited? 
4. Is there some other case C3 that is also similar to C1, but in which A is false (true)? 
 
Applied to the example of the transmission masts, the opponent who identifies that the 
emissions from electrical pylons are not the same as the emissions from masts has posed 
the third of these critical questions. In so doing, he or she has discharged the burden of 
proof onto the proponent of the analogical argument. The proponent of this argument must 
either demonstrate that the emissions from the two types of installation are not dissimilar 
in the respect suggested or accept that there is no basis for the claim at the centre of the 
argument (i.e. it is false that emissions from transmission masts cause childhood cancer). 
The third critical question is not the only way in which the burden of proof created by the 
analogical argument may be discharged. The second critical question could lead an 
opponent to ask if it really is the case that emissions from electricity pylons cause childhood 
cancer – we saw above that this cannot be definitively stated. Alternatively, an opponent 
may respond to the argument from analogy by posing the fourth critical question. In this 
case, the opponent discharges the burden of proof by presenting a counter-analogy. For 
example, it may be argued that electricity sub-stations have been found to produce the 
same emissions as electricity pylons but with no evidence of them causing childhood cancer. 
With each critical question that is posed, the rational grounds of the contested claim in the 
argument are laid bare. A presumptive analysis of analogical argument accounts for this 
rational development in terms of the transition between presumption and burden of proof 




Walton’s emphasis on the role of critical questions in analogical argument will be central to 
the view of this argument as a cognitive heuristic which will be developed in section 3. For 
integral to this view is the idea that lay people are capable of raising and addressing such 
questions even if they do not do so on particular occasions or in certain settings. Valuable as 
Walton’s insights are, they do not address epistemic aspects of presumption which are also 
vital to the heuristic function of analogical argument. On these aspects, the work of Nicholas 
Rescher makes an important contribution. Rescher does not deny the dialectical character 
of presumption.8 However, even as he acknowledges this dialectical character, Rescher is at 
pains to emphasize the epistemic nature of presumptions and their role in rational 
(principally scientific) inquiry. Rescher (2006: 6) describes presumptions as low-grade data 
which cannot lay claim to knowledge, although they may eventually become knowledge 
claims: 
 
‘*P+resumption is certainly not knowledge: we do not know what we merely 
presume to be so. As an informative resource its standing is quite different from 
that of knowledge.’ (italics in original) 
 
Although it is not knowledge, a presumed thesis is not thereby without any rational basis. 
When I presume that p, I am indicating that p has some rational standing even if I am not 
prepared to commit wholeheartedly to that proposition. This standing may be on account of 
the provenance of a thesis. For example, there is a presumption of veracity in favour of 
theses derived from the senses but not for theses derived from telepathy or astrology. So 
even though I may be mistaken on occasion about what I see and hear, I can at least 
presume theses from my visual and auditory faculties to be true in a way that I cannot for 
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theses obtained by telepathy or from astrology. Because presumptions are accepted on a 
tentative basis, circumstances can arise in which they are shown to be false or erroneous. It 
then becomes necessary to reject or overturn them. The defeasibility of presumptions in the 
face of countervailing considerations makes this possible without incurring wider revisions 
in our body of knowledge. (Presumptions do not have a foundational role in our knowledge 
so error does not necessitate a wider revision of knowledge.) Of course, presumptions can 
only be overturned by the emergence of contrary evidence if they are sensitive to features 
of the contexts in which they are found. Context sensitivity is thus an important attribute of 
this epistemic concept. Presumptions also display an orientation to action in that they 
permit the progress of an inquiry where a demand for knowledge would serve only to stall 
an inquiry. These features of epistemic presumption – their low-grade status, rational 
standing, defeasibility, context sensitivity and orientation to action – receive philosophical 
discussion and analysis in Rescher (2006). Their role within an important public health 
problem, the emergence of BSE in British cattle, is examined at length in Cummings (2002, 
2005, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b). 
 
3. Analogical argument as a heuristic 
Thus far, analogical argument has been described as a type of presumptive argument. As a 
presumptive argument, the premises, conclusion and inference of an analogical argument 
have the status of presumptions, with all that this entails (e.g. defeasibility, context 
sensitivity). Also as a presumptive argument, analogical argument draws on the dialectical 
and epistemic properties of presumptions which were described in section 2. The task for 
the current section is to demonstrate how these same properties contribute to analogical 
argument as a heuristic during reasoning about public health problems. To dialectical and 
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epistemic properties of presumption we must add cognitive and evolutionary 
considerations. This is because in presenting analogical argument as a heuristic, we are 
characterizing it as a cognitive procedure. We will see that the function of this procedure is 
to provide a type of cognitive shortcut through our deliberations in public health (and 
elsewhere). Analogical argument is particularly well suited to this cognitive function, it is 
contended, because it is an evolutionary adaptation on the part of human rationality to the 
problems of epistemic uncertainty and a lack of knowledge. Put simply, we cannot survive 
as organisms within environments that are characterized by pervasive uncertainty, if we lack 
cognitive resources which are equipped to cope with that uncertainty. Analogical argument 
is one part of the rational toolkit which evolution has bestowed on us and which makes us 
cognitively fit for our environment. Similar cognitive and evolutionary claims have been 
advanced elsewhere,9 and will be discussed further below. But for our purposes, we must 
return to the claim that analogical argument has a heuristic function during public health 
reasoning. We will now support this claim by addressing the following issues: (1) there must 
be some purpose for which analogical argument is advanced; (2) there must be some means 
by which analogical reasoning is performed; and (3) there must be some outcome to this 
reasoning, where ‘outcome’ is broadly construed to include any gain in knowledge or 
practical gain. 
 
In relation to (1), the purpose for which an analogical argument is advanced in a public 
health context is to facilitate judgement-making in the absence of knowledge. On an 
individual level, these judgements may concern one’s personal risk of developing skin 
cancer or the decision to vaccinate one’s children against infectious disease. On a larger 
scale, they may also involve assessments of the safety of certain foods for human 
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consumption or the risks of exposure to carcinogens from chemical plants and nuclear 
facilities. What all these judgements have in common is their reliance on specialized or 
expert knowledge which is lacking on the part of the lay person. Yet, these are still 
judgements which we are all required to make to a greater or lesser extent as part of our 
daily deliberations. It is against this backdrop that analogical argument functions as a quick 
and effective heuristic, or as a pragmatic ‘rule of thumb’, that guides judgement-making by 
bypassing gaps in knowledge. The analogical template made possible by a well-known 
infectious disease or a long-established technology allows the lay person to perform a much 
simpler cognitive operation than would otherwise be the case. By identifying a small 
number of salient properties in a new and unknown domain based on these same 
properties in the template, the lay person can arrive at a rationally warranted judgement in 
the absence of knowledge of a range of complex scientific issues. In effect, the lay individual 
is setting aside technical and other considerations which are not part of his or her current 
knowledge state. This lack of knowledge may simply reflect one’s educational background 
(people may not have had education and training in the requisite disciplines), or it may be 
on account of cognitive limitations (even with training, many of these technical and 
scientific issues will not be readily understood by people).   
 
We are not quite done with the purpose for which analogical argument is used in our 
cognitive deliberations. Clearly, there is a survival advantage for the organism that can make 
accurate judgements about an issue using a minimum of cognitive resources. Because such 
an organism is not expending all its cognitive resources in forming judgements, it is then 
free to direct these resources to the solution of other problems in its environment. 
Heuristics – and analogical argument to the extent that it is a heuristic – are ideally suited to 
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the type of cognitive efficiency which is described here. There is a considerable cognitive 
economy to be had in analogical reasoning. This is because cognitive resources such as 
memory and attention are employed to the minimal extent possible when large bodies of 
expert knowledge do not have to be stored by a cognitive agent, and when multiple 
features of a new situation are not the focus of an agent’s attention. Moreover, it is a 
common misconception that the reduced cognitive processing which attends the use of 
heuristics must necessarily lead to a reduction in the accuracy of the judgements which are 
arrived at by means of those heuristics. Quite apart from being less accurate than 
systematic reasoning processes, simple heuristics have been found to perform comparably 
to more complex algorithms. Todd and Gigerenzer (2000: 727) state that:  
 
‘*W+e show how simple building blocks that control information search, stop 
search, and make decisions can be put together to form classes of heuristics, 
including: ignorance-based and one-reason decision making for choice, 
elimination models for categorization, and satisficing heuristics for sequential 
search. These simple heuristics perform comparably to more complex 
algorithms, particularly when generalizing to new data.’  
 
So, the purpose of analogical argument is not simply to facilitate judgement-making in the 
absence of knowledge, but also to conserve cognitive resources without thereby 
compromising the accuracy of judgements. In reducing the number and range of cognitive 
resources which must be directly applied to judgement-making, analogical argument also 




In relation to (2), the means by which analogical reasoning is performed is twofold and 
corresponds to the dialectical and epistemic properties of this presumptive argument. The 
dialectical features of analogical argument enable this argument to function as a form of 
systematic reasoning which is slow and deliberative in nature. During systematic reasoning, 
a cognitive agent interrogates the rational grounds of an analogical argument by addressing 
a series of critical questions. These questions challenge us to consider features of this 
argument which are integral to its rational warrant. They include: Is the purported similarity 
between two entities or situations a sufficient basis for the conclusion of an analogical 
argument? Can a third entity or situation be brought forward which is similar to the first, 
but in which the inferred property does not hold? (see Walton (1996) for further discussion 
of critical questions). In addressing these critical questions, and weighing up the significance 
of responses for the rational warrant of an analogical argument, a cognitive agent must 
attend to every detail that has a bearing on an issue. But this type of systematic reasoning is 
achieved at considerable cost to a cognitive agent. Such an agent must access memory, 
assimilate information and assess (often conflicting) evidence. Each of these cognitive 
resources incurs a cost for the agent who must also devote more processing time to the 
deliberation of an issue. Given this additional cost and processing time, the dialectical form 
of analogical argument can only be implemented within certain discursive contexts. One 
such context is an inquiry in which investigators usually have considerable time to examine 
all aspects of an issue before arriving at a judgement (e.g. the three-year public inquiry into 
BSE in the UK). The dialectical form of analogical reasoning is illustrated by arrow A (a 







However, there are many situations in public health and elsewhere in which decisions must 
be taken against a backdrop of considerable urgency (e.g. the decision how best to contain a 
rapidly escalating outbreak of infectious disease). In these cases, agents must abandon the 
use of critical questions and arrive at a judgement through a quicker and less costly 
cognitive route than that which is afforded by systematic reasoning. This route involves the 
use of heuristics such as analogical argument. Heuristics are specially adapted to arrive at 
quick and effective solutions to problems. It is the epistemic properties of analogical 
argument which permit its use as a heuristic. It will be recalled from section 2 that 
presumptions exhibit epistemic features which make them well suited to cope with the 
uncertainty of public health and other contexts. It is these features of presumption which 
underpin the use of analogical argument as a heuristic. As presumptive theses, the premises 
in an analogical argument are accepted on a tentative basis – there is no costly expansion of 
the rational grounds of these premises such as occurs in systematic reasoning. Also as 
presumptive theses, the premises in an analogical argument licence actions in the practical 
sphere often in advance of cognitive deliberations – the type of intensive cognitive 
deliberation that is typical of systematic reasoning does not occur. As a presumptive thesis, 
the conclusion of an analogical argument may be overturned without necessitating a wider 
revision of our body of knowledge and beliefs. Belief revision is costly in cognitive terms and 
is only undertaken in extremis. This cost is largely averted when analogical argument is used 
as a heuristic. Clearly, a different (and less costly) form of analogical argument which draws 
on epistemic properties of presumption must also be included within our rational resources. 
This heuristic form of analogical argument is represented by arrow B (a probabilistic 




In relation to (3), it is not difficult to demonstrate a clear outcome from the use of analogical 
reasoning in a public health context. Outcome is construed here as any demonstrable 
epistemic and practical gain that accrues from the use of analogical argument. In terms of 
epistemic gains, analogical argument functions as a productive source of new claims which 
can advance an inquiry. The analogical arguments displayed below were vital in progressing 
key aspects of the scientific inquiry into BSE at a time when little was known about this new 
disease (Cummings, 2010: 94-95). These analogical arguments supported presumptive 
conclusions concerning the transmission routes, host range and pathogenesis of BSE. These 
conclusions contributed to the developing knowledge base on BSE until such times as results 
from experimental studies were forthcoming: 
 
Transmission routes: 
MAJOR PREMISE: BSE is similar to scrapie in sheep. 
MINOR PREMISE: There is maternal and lateral transmission of scrapie in sheep. 
CONCLUSION:       There will be maternal and lateral transmission of BSE in cattle. 
 
Host range: 
MAJOR PREMISE: BSE is similar to scrapie in sheep. 
MINOR PREMISE: Scrapie has been transmitted to marmosets, mink, goats, mice, sheep and  
                               hamsters. 
CONCLUSION:       BSE will be transmitted to marmosets, mink, goats, mice, sheep and  





MAJOR PREMISE: BSE is similar to scrapie in sheep. 
MINOR PREMISE: In scrapie, infectivity does not reach the brain or spinal cord in the first 6  
                               months of life. 
CONCLUSION:       In BSE, infectivity will not reach the brain or spinal cord in the first 6  
                               months of life. 
 
As well as contributing to the knowledge base on BSE, these analogical arguments also had 
practical implications for the containment of the disease. Pathogenesis studies at the 
Central Veterinary Laboratory would enable scientists to establish which bovine tissues 
were infective and, therefore, needed to be removed from the human food chain. However, 
such is the length of the incubation period of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies 
that these studies would take many months and even to complete. A significant ban to 
protect public health – the human Specified Bovine Offal (SBO) ban – could not be delayed 
until results from these studies became available. In the absence of experimental results, 
public health officials needed to establish which bovine tissues were candidates for inclusion 
in the ban. Analogical arguments based on scrapie were used to establish the terms of the 
SBO ban. A further practical gain achieved through the use of these analogical arguments 
was the establishment of research priorities. Experimental transmission studies were used 
to determine the host range of BSE. However, these studies were particularly expensive to 
undertake and risked diverting funding from other important areas of veterinary research. 
Some means needed to be found of narrowing the potentially large range of species for 
inclusion in these studies. That means was analogical argument. Finally, farmers who had 
breeding cattle required urgent advice on how best to reduce the risk of BSE transmission 
from dams to their calves. In the early months of the BSE epidemic, scientists lacked 
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evidence relating to the maternal transmission of the disease. In the absence of evidence, 
advice to farmers from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food was based on what 
was known about maternal transmission in scrapie. From giving advice to farmers and 
instituting public health bans to establishing research priorities, analogical argument 
resulted in a number of important, practical gains during the UK’s BSE epidemic. 
  
4. Study of public health reasoning 
The largely philosophical considerations examined so far lead one to ask if systematic and 
heuristic variants of analogical argument have psychological reality in the reasoning of lay 
people. This question was the focus of a recent study of public health reasoning by 
members of the public. Given the dependence of systematic and heuristic variants of 
analogical argument on quite distinct properties of this argument – dialectical and epistemic 
properties, respectively – this question naturally resolves itself into an examination of the 
role of these properties in subjects’ logical judgements on public health problems. To this 
end, it was predicted that subjects would be able to identify the dialectical and epistemic 
conditions which confer rational warrant on analogical argument and, by the same token, 
the conditions under which this argument is weakly warranted. It was also predicted that 
subjects would appeal to the dialectical and epistemic properties of analogical argument to 
support their validity ratings of these arguments. Analogical argument was one of four 
arguments examined in the study. The three remaining arguments, which included 
arguments from ignorance and authority and circular argument, are reported elsewhere 
(Cummings, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). What unites these arguments is their capacity to 
function as heuristics during reasoning about public health problems. This is despite the fact 
that each has endured a long and inglorious history in logic as an informal fallacy.10 A 
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detailed discussion of this investigation cannot be undertaken in the present context. This 
section will, therefore, describe in brief the method used in the study and report some of its 
quantitative and qualitative results. For further discussion of the rationale for the study and 
an analysis of its findings, the reader is referred to Cummings (2014a). 
 
A total of 879 subjects participated in the study. All subjects were between 18 and 65 years 
of age. Male and female subjects from any ethnic or socioeconomic background and of any 
educational level were admitted to the study (see Table 1 for subject characteristics). For 
the most part, the participation of subjects was secured through a series of formal 
recruitment activities conducted in local hospitals, large retail outlets and private health 
clubs in the East Midlands region of the UK. There was no financial or other incentive 
offered to subjects for their participation in the study. Subjects received a brief explanation 
of the study prior to giving their agreement to participate in it. Each subject was presented 
with eight public health scenarios in the form of written passages in a postal questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was completed anonymously in the subject’s own time. Scenarios 
described a range of actual and non-actual public health problems. Background beliefs and 
knowledge are known to influence reasoning.11 The inclusion of non-actual scenarios, about 
which subjects were less likely to have prior beliefs, served to control this effect to some 
extent. Each scenario had been examined by two public health consultants before the start 
of the study in order to assess their plausibility as public health problems. Two academic 
linguists also examined the passages in order to assess their comprehensibility to the lay 
person. On the basis of these pre-study checks, all passages were considered to be plausible 




Four passages were used to examine analogical arguments: (1) the use of hepatitis B by the 
Centers for Disease Control in the US as a model for HIV/AIDS health advice; (2) an 
investigation by epidemiologists of illness related to chemicals in drinking water; (3) the use 
of scrapie by British scientists to assess the risk of BSE to human health; and (4) a study by 
epidemiologists of the health effects of a new arthritis drug. These passages were carefully 
constructed in order to represent a range of conditions which subjects might deem 
significant in an assessment of the rational warrant of analogical arguments. Four questions 
followed each passage. Two of the questions required a yes/no response or a response of a 
few words, and could be answered on the basis of information explicitly presented in the 
corresponding passage. These questions were intended to give respondents the impression 
that they were engaging in a reading comprehension task and thus served to distract 
subjects from the main purpose of the study. A third question was intended to establish if 
subjects accepted the conclusion of an analogical argument. Conclusions could be rated as 
valid, moderately valid or not valid at all, where ‘validity’ was intended in a mundane (and 
not a strictly deductive) sense. A fourth question asked subjects to explain their answer to 
this question. It was intended to elicit an open response from which information could be 
gleaned about the factors that had been significant in the individual subject’s reasoning. The 
following passage and questions examined an analogical argument with the features <actual 
scenario, strong analogy>: 
 
In 1981, reports of a rare form of pneumonia in five previously healthy 
homosexual males treated in three Los Angeles hospitals appeared in the 
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report in the United States. Little did the global 
scientific community know then that it was witnessing early cases of what was 
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to become known as AIDS. Initially, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) did not 
know what pathogen was responsible for this new disease. Before the HIV virus 
was even identified, the CDC issued advice on how the public could best protect 
itself against AIDS. This advice included information about safe sex practices and 
the avoidance of needle sharing by intravenous drug users. The CDC’s advice 
was based on its belief that the causal agent of AIDS must be a blood-borne virus 
given similarities between the population groups who were developing AIDS and 
those groups that were susceptible to another blood-borne virus, hepatitis B. 
These groups were homosexual males, intravenous drug users and recipients of 
blood transfusions. CDC scientists had extensive experience of the hepatitis B 
virus by the time the first cases of AIDS emerged. Consequently, they had little 
difficulty adapting public health information used for hepatitis B to address this 
new disease that confronted them. 
 
(a) Did the first cases of AIDS in the US appear in hospitals in San Francisco? 
 
(b) The CDC believed that AIDS was caused by a blood-borne virus. Was the 
CDC’s belief (i) valid (ii) moderately valid or (iii) not valid at all (please circle 
answer)? 
 
(c) In which population group were the first five cases of AIDS documented? 
 




As shown in Table 2, strong analogies were consistently rated as more valid by subjects than 
weak analogies. This was evident across both actual and non-actual scenarios. In this way, 
51.4% of subjects rated a strong analogy as valid and only 10.3% rated a weak analogy as 
valid within an actual scenario. Within a non-actual scenario, a strong analogy was rated as 
valid by 49.1% of subjects and a weak analogy was rated as valid by 5.2% of subjects. The 
highest ratings of ‘not valid at all’ were consistently found for weak analogies across both 
actual and non-actual scenarios. Weak analogies were rated as not valid at all by 74.5% of 
subjects (non-actual scenario) and 51.9% of subjects (actual scenario), while only 9.4% of 
subjects (non-actual scenario) and 7.3% of subjects (actual scenario) rated strong analogies 
as not valid at all. There appeared to be negligible percentage differences in subject ratings 
of validity across actual and non-actual scenarios. For example, responses to the passages 
which examine strong analogies were as follows: actual scenario (51.4% valid; 41.3% 
moderately valid; 7.3% not valid at all) and non-actual scenario (49.1% valid; 41.5% 
moderately valid; 9.4% not valid at all). 
 
More significant in the present context was the qualitative data obtained from subjects. This 
data provided support for the claim that subjects are able to identify dialectical and 
epistemic properties of analogical arguments. Moreover, they appear to attach quite 
different roles to these properties within their reasoning. Many comments reflected a 
concern on the part of respondents to ‘test’ analogical arguments by subjecting their 
premises to critical questions. In relation to the major premise, the strength of the 
presumed similarity between two entities (often, infectious diseases) was variously 
interrogated. In some cases, this similarity was judged to be persuasive but not conclusive 
(comment 1). This suggested the application by subjects of a normative standard beyond 
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that of mere persuasion. Where a similarity was judged not to be conclusive, subjects often 
stated that it provided an inadequate (‘flawed’) basis for a conclusion based upon it 
(comment 2). Where a similarity was evaluated in positive terms, respondents often 
indicated this through expressions of scientific validity (comment 3): 
 
(1) ‘Whilst similarities are persuasive, they aren’t conclusive, so I opted for 
“moderately valid”’ (40-year-old, university educated, White British female). 
 
(2) ‘At this time it was not conclusive that BSE and scrapie were related diseases 
– it was only a suggestion, therefore the reasoning behind the suggestion that 
BSE would not transmit to humans was flawed’ (32-year-old, university 
educated, White British female). 
 
(3) ‘the CDC would seem to have made a scientifically based connection 
between an existing disease and a new one’ (49-year-old, university educated, 
White Irish female). 
 
The minor premise of analogical arguments was also the focus of dialectical evaluation. The 
minor premise of the analogical argument based on scrapie – ‘scrapie is not transmissible to 
humans’ – was challenged by several respondents. Technological and medical limitations 
during the 250-year history of scrapie, it was argued, weakened the rational warrant of this 
premise (comment 4). For other respondents, the similar epidemiological features of BSE 
and scrapie were not a sufficient basis for a conclusion about the transmissibility of BSE 
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(comment 5). It was clear that for these respondents, the analogical argument based on 
scrapie failed to adequately address the second critical question in Figure 1 above: 
 
(4) ‘how do we know that scrapie may not have transmitted to humans in 250 
years as technology has not been advanced over the 250 years and people died 
of unknown conditions’ (37-year-old, secondary school educated, White British 
female). 
 
(5) ‘it doesn’t seem to me a safe assumption that because two diseases are 
‘related’ they will necessarily act in the same way as far as transmission to 
humans is concerned’ (62-year-old, university educated, White British male). 
 
Some respondents used the analogy between BSE and scrapie to draw a different (typically 
contrary) conclusion about the transmissibility of BSE to humans. Although this did not 
qualify as a counter-analogy – respondents still reasoned from the analogy between BSE and 
scrapie described in the passage – it did reveal considerable logical acuity on the part of 
subjects as they proceeded to address critical questions of this argument. The response of 
one subject is shown below (comment 6). The analogical argument implicit in this response 
is reconstructed alongside it: 
 
(6) ‘If cows eating sheep tissue products could develop BSE, then could humans 
not develop a form of the disease by eating BSE infected meat?’ (32-year-old, 




MAJOR PREMISE: BSE in cattle is similar to scrapie in sheep. 
MINOR PREMISE: Scrapie is transmissible to other species. 
CONCLUSION:       BSE will also be transmissible to other species (viz., humans). 
 
Epistemic properties of analogical arguments were also frequently commented upon by 
subjects. It was described in section 2 how the presumptions that constitute the premises 
and conclusions of these arguments are low-grade data. Respondents variously indicated 
this by describing the conclusions of these arguments as ‘suggestions’ (comment 2) or 
‘assumptions’ which are not based on ‘rigorous scientific evidence’ (comment 7). In a 
smaller number of cases, respondents used expressions such as ‘guess’ (comment 8) and 
‘only an analogy’ (comment 9) to indicate that these conclusions had a low-level epistemic 
standing. The expression ‘leap of faith’ (comment 10) suggested that for some respondents, 
analogical conclusions had no rational standing whatsoever (but see section 2 above): 
 
(7) ‘It’s a reasonable assumption given what they knew about hepatitis B, but 
wasn’t based on rigorous scientific evidence at that time’ (51-year-old, university 
educated, White Australian female). 
 
(8) ‘Unless the diseases were one and the same, it could surely not be concluded 
that they would behave in exactly the same way. At best the conclusions would 




(9) ‘comparison with hepatitis B is only an analogy – therefore there must be a 
degree of uncertainty about the conclusion drawn’ (46-year-old, university 
educated, White British male). 
 
(10) ‘I can see the point but it is a leap of faith, a big assumption and not based 
on BSE evidence’ (29-year-old, university educated, White British male). 
 
In section 2, it was described how the low-grade status of presumptions enabled scientists 
to embark on an inquiry or investigation when a demand for knowledge would serve only to 
stall inquiry. Several respondents captured this function of analogical argument through the 
use of expressions such as ‘good starting point’ (comment 11) and ‘valid initial start’ 
(comment 12): 
 
(11) ‘I think it was a good starting point as the chemical compound in question 
was identified as being similar to the chemical identified in causing the ailments 
stated’ (29-year-old, university educated, Black British Caribbean female). 
 
(12) ‘This was a valid initial start to the investigation, until the actual cause could 
be isolated’ (48-year-old, university educated, White British female). 
 
Although analogical arguments were judged to be a good starting point for an inquiry, 
respondents stated that they should not be pursued at the expense of other sources of 
evidence. It was described in section 2 how presumptions in analogical arguments have a 
high potential for error given their tentative nature. For this reason, it is important to 
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consider other sources of evidence in an inquiry. Several comments suggested that 
respondents were keenly aware that analogical arguments must not be considered to the 
exclusion of other evidence. Respondents remarked that an investigation must ‘focus on all 
sources’ (comment 13). Although analogical arguments are a ‘fair starting point’ in an 
inquiry, it must ‘move outwards’ (comment 14). These arguments should not form the ‘only 
line of enquiry’ (comment 15): 
 
(13) ‘I have circled not valid at all, because the epidemiologists have been sent 
to do an extensive enquiry and not just one source that is singled out. They need 
to focus on all sources just in case one has slipped through the net (so to speak)’ 
(51-year-old, secondary school educated, White British female). 
 
(14) ‘It is a fair starting point but only such. The investigation should have then 
moved outwards’ (50-year-old, university educated, White British male). 
 
(15) ‘It seems logical to use existing knowledge about another similar chemical 
to investigate whether the second chemical was the source of the health 
problems in the area. I suppose it should not have been the only line of enquiry 
though, and other possibilities should also have been investigated’ (29-year-old, 
university educated, White British female). 
 
Finally, an examination of other sources of evidence brings with it the possibility that we 
may have to reject the conclusions of analogical arguments. As a form of presumptive 
reasoning, analogical arguments are inherently defeasible and are readily overturned by the 
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emergence of ‘new information’ in an inquiry (comment 16). This was a decisive 
consideration in the reasoning of several subjects in the study: 
 
(16) ‘belief is based on the knowledge available at the time and can be subject to 
change due to new intervening factors/information. So at the time the belief 
was ‘valid’ subject to possible future information affecting it’ (51-year-old, 
university educated, White European female). 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has contended that analogical argument plays a vital role in the logical 
judgements of experts and lay people on matters relating to public health. That role was 
characterized as a cognitive heuristic. Analogical argument was shown to function as a quick 
and effective shortcut through public health problems by closing gaps in our knowledge. 
These gaps arise because most public health problems involve expert knowledge and levels 
of specialization which are beyond the competence and experience of lay people. Yet, 
people must still undertake judgements about these problems if only to assess their 
implications for their own health. Within this context, analogical argument was seen to cut 
through the uncertainty created by a lack of knowledge and, in doing so, arrive at solutions 
to these problems. This was at all possible because of the presumptive nature of this 
argument. As a form of presumptive reasoning, analogical argument was shown to exhibit 
both dialectical and epistemic properties. These properties are significant in that they are 
essential to systematic and heuristic versions of analogical argument, respectively. 
Dialectical properties capture the use of critical questions to interrogate the rational basis of 
analogical argument. This form of reasoning is slow and deliberative as it attends to every 
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detail. It is also a cognitively costly form of reasoning. Epistemic properties are essential to 
the use of analogical argument in heuristic reasoning. This form of reasoning is quick and 
cognitively efficient as it bypasses the critical questions that are integral to systematic 
reasoning. An investigation of 879 members of the public revealed that people appeal to 
both sets of properties in their logical judgements about public health problems. 
 
It is pertinent to ask what implications, if any, this view of analogical argument has for the 
practice of public health. It is essential to the success of public health interventions that 
people make informed choices based on advice issued by public health officials and 
scientists. In communicating this advice, public health experts tend to conflate the public’s 
(very real) lack of knowledge about public health problems with a lack of a rational capacity 
to engage in logical judgements about those problems. If this study has demonstrated 
anything, it is that lay members of the public are attune to the logical conditions under 
which analogical arguments are more or less rationally warranted. This includes dialectical 
and epistemic properties of these arguments and the functions of these properties within 
systematic and heuristic reasoning. To the extent that lay people would appear to have this 
rational capacity, it seems advisable for practitioners to attempt to exploit it during public 
health communication. In order to increase the public’s understanding of, and willingness to 
participate in, public health interventions, experts should make explicit the role of analogical 
reasoning in their advice when it comes to framing public health messages. Moreover, 
public health experts who pursue this course of action can have reasonable confidence that 
that lay members of the public possess the requisite rational resources to evaluate this 
reasoning. This confidence may also encourage a candid approach to informing the public 
about the conditions under which a currently strongly warranted analogical argument may 
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be weakened by future developments (e.g. emergence of new and contrary evidence). 
These conditions are less likely to be greeted by alarmist reactions in a public which is 
versed in rational appraisal. The view that lay members of the public are rational agents, 
even if not always knowledgeable agents, may or may not lead to a more effective form of 
public health communication. But even if it does not lead to improved communication, 
public health will have taken an important step forward in terms of understanding the 


























1. It should be emphasized that in discussing analogies in public health, there are many 
analogies that are not of relevance to the current discussion. These analogies have a 
figurative, ethical or descriptive function rather than a logical purpose. They include an 
analogy between infectious diseases and war (De Grandis, 2011), between dose-response in 
toxicology and public health areas such as diet, alcohol and physical activity (Whitelaw, 
2012), and the use of normative analogies in establishing ways in which new and emerging 
technologies such as umbilical cord blood biobanking should be used (Hofmann et al., 2006). 
These analogies do not have an argumentative function, although they may perform other, 
equally important roles: ‘Figurative analogies do not argue, though they may elucidate’ 
(Waller, 2001: 200).  
 
2. A zoonosis is any disease which transmits to humans from a lower vertebrate. In 
transmitting from cattle to humans, BSE is a zoonotic condition.   
 
3. Parenteral transmission is defined as that which occurs outside of the alimentary tract, 
such as in subcutaneous, intravenous, intramuscular and intrasternal injections (Berkley, 
1991). 
 
4. On 20 March 1996, Mr Stephen Dorrell, the then Secretary of State for Health, announced 
to British Parliament that BSE was responsible for a new form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease 
(CJD) in several young people. This was the first public acknowledgement that BSE had 
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transmitted to humans. It marked the beginning of a human health crisis which is continuing 
to this day.  
 
5. Wood (2006: 361) states that ‘the characteristics of the electric and magnetic fields 
associated with high voltage power lines are quite different from the radiofrequency 
emissions from mobile telephony systems’. Wood (2006: 364) also remarks that ‘*t+aken 
individually, some, but by no means all *…+ studies show evidence of raised cancer risk and 
B-field exposure’. The B-field is one of two types of field associated with electrical power 
systems.  
 
6. An example of public discourse in which a logical similarity is made between Thalidomide 
and Epilim includes the following. On 11 March 2013, the blog of Paul Flynn (Labour 
Member of Parliament for Newport West in Wales) remarked of Epilim that ‘*i+t could be 
worse than Thalidomide for the same reasons’. This italicised expression attests to the well-
established causal link between the ingestion of Thalidomide during pregnancy and the 
development of birth defects.   
 
7. The tendency to apply an incorrect standard to the evaluation of arguments, and then 
condemn arguments as fallacious when they fall short of this standard, has been 
widespread in logic and argumentation. Finocchiaro (1981: 15-16) remarks of this practice 
as follows: ‘*L+et us examine the second element of textbook accounts of fallacies, the 
description of various devices which I wish to call by the neutral term of “disputed 
practices”. One problem with these descriptions is that they are usually prejudicial in the 
sense that their fallaciousness is built right into their description…There is a pattern in these 
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biased descriptions, and it is the following. If the disputed practice is a type of inductive 
argument, namely one claiming that the conclusion is only strongly, but not conclusively, 
supported by the premises, then the practice will be described as a type of deductive 
argument, namely one claiming that the conclusion is conclusively supported by the 
premises. If the disputed practice is a type of what might be called a partial argument, 
namely one claiming that the conclusion is only partly, but not too strongly supported by 
the premises, then the practice will be described as a type of allegedly inductively strong 
argument…the pattern (or shall I say the fallacy?) is that of exaggerating the strength of the 
connection claimed between various assertions…’.   
 
8. Godden and Walton (2007) attribute the first detailed account of presumption in a 
dialectical framework to Rescher (1977). 
 
9. The reader is referred to Walton (2010) for an excellent discussion of these cognitive and 
evolutionary issues as they relate to informal fallacies such as the argument from expertise. 
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) and Gigerenzer (2000) conduct a wide-ranging discussion of 
these cognitive and evolutionary issues in relation to heuristics. 
 
10. More recent analyses have described non-fallacious variants of petitio principii (begging 
the question), argumentum ad ignorantiam (the argument from ignorance), and 
argumentum ad baculum (the argument from the stick or appeal to force), among other 




11. It is expected that background knowledge and beliefs will affect the information that 
subjects attend to in the passages and the significance that subjects attach to this 
information. As Klahr (2000: 30) remarks: ‘When people are reasoning about real world 
contexts, their prior knowledge imposes strong theoretical biases…These biases influence 
not only the initial strength with which hypotheses are held – and hence the amount of 
disconfirming evidence necessary to refute them – but also the features in the evidence that 







              SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
      AGE 
 
   Average: 43.8 years 
   Range: 18-65 years 
 
   GENDER 
 
   Male: 292 subjects 
   Female: 587 subjects 
 
  EDUCATION 
    
 
   University level: 589 subjects 
   Secondary school level: 290 subjects 
 
  ETHNICITY 
 
   White British: 789 subjects 
   White Irish: 30 subjects 
   Asian or British Asian Indian: 15 subjects 
   Asian or British Asian Pakistani: 4 subjects 
   Black or Black British Caribbean: 3 subjects 
   Black or Black British African: 3 subjects 
   Mixed: White and Black Caribbean: 1 subject 
   Mixed: White and Black African: 1 subject 
   Mixed: White and Asian: 1 subject 
   Other: 32 subjects  
 









                STRONG 
 




      ACTUAL 
 
Strong analogy; Actual scenario 
 
Results: 
Valid: 51.4%  
Moderately valid: 41.3%  
Not valid at all: 7.3% 
 




Moderately valid: 37.8%  




  NON-ACTUAL 
 
Strong analogy; Non-actual 
 
Results: 
Valid: 49.1%  
Moderately valid: 41.5% 
Not valid at all: 9.4% 
 




Moderately valid: 20.3% 
Not valid at all: 74.5% 
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